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ABSTRACT

Federal funds for youth employment programs have increased for two decades, yet program effectiveness could improve if greater coordination between job training agencies and educational institutions were achieved. Initial coordination efforts gave educational agencies a major role in governing and operating the vocational education services needed by local manpower programs. With the enactment of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), state and local manpower agencies were given freedom to develop and operate educational programs. Educators criticized these arrangements, and Congress amended CETA to give them a greater role. Some evidence, such as increased communication and cooperation, suggests that administrative relationships between educational institutions and manpower agencies have improved. Most educational institutions, however, continue to treat manpower programs as low priorities. Few have matched CETA dollars with their own resources or developed mechanisms for awarding credit for work experience. Most manpower agencies have made little effort to develop training programs with a strong basic educational component. Causes of weak linkages include recency of CETA coordination mandates, defects in the mandates, and characteristics of manpower agencies and schools which probably cannot be changed by coordination alone. (A table of findings of exemplary CETA-local education agency service agreements is appended.) (YLB)

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REPORT #4

MANPOWER-EDUCATION COORDINATION: TWO DECADES OF FRUSTRATION

WILLIAM H. WILKEN
LAWRENCE L. BROWN III

Office of Technical and Analytic Systems

Office of Planning and Budget

U.S. Department of Education

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REPORT #4

MANPOWER-EDUCATION COORDINATION: TWO DECADES OF FRUSTRATION

WILLIAM H. WILKEN
LAWRENCE L. BROWN III

JANUARY 1981

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal funds for job training programs have increased steadily in recent decades. These funds are channeled to state and local areas through a variety of programs authorized in legislation such as the Vocational Education Act (VEA) and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). In recent years federal policy-makers have repeatedly sought to promote coordination between job training agencies and educational institutions.

Initial coordination efforts gave education agencies a major role in governing and operating the vocational education services needed by local manpower programs. With the enactment of CETA, however, the Congress gave state and local manpower agencies considerable freedom to develop and operate educational programs. Educators criticized these arrangements and in 1977 and 1978 Congress amended the CETA programs to give state and local education agencies an assured role in the provision of educational services needed by manpower clients. In addition, some CETA programs now include mandated financial set-asides for educational agencies and institutions.

The CETA amendments have been in effect for only a short period of time and it is impossible to assess their impact definitively. Some evidence suggests that administrative relationships between educational institutions and manpower agencies have improved: there is greater interagency communication on common problems, more cooperation in planning, and increased sharing of financial resources. In many respects, however, these linkages are superficial. Most educational institutions continue to treat manpower programs as low priorities. Few have matched CETA dollars with resources of their own and few have developed mechanisms for awarding academic credit for work experience. Similarly, most manpower agencies have made little effort to develop training programs with a strong basic educational component. Thus, although CETA outlays for education appear impressive, close inspection reveals that the largest percentage of these expenditures is for participant stipends and support services; only a small amount is allocated for instructional services.

While more effective coordination between manpower and education agencies may occur in the future, such changes must be regarded as possible but not probable. Productive coordination is restricted by differences in the budget cycles between manpower and education programs, uncertainty over the funding of CETA's youth programs, and the fragmentation of the CETA programs. Most importantly, perhaps, are underlying political/administrative problems that are not addressed by the coordination mandates in CETA.

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INTRODUCTION

Federal policymakers have been attempting to root out youth unemployment for nearly two decades. Yet, after many different programs and expenditures which now exceed $2.2 billion annually, the problem remains very serious. As one recent study points out:

- For 17 of the last 20 years, more than 10 percent of all persons between 16 and 24 in the labor force have been out of work — about three times the proportion for adults 25 and older . . .
- Almost 2.6 million, or roughly 10 percent of the youth aged 16 to 24 in the labor force during 1978 were unemployed for 15 weeks or longer. At the same time, as many as 1.5 million more youth were not looking for work but said they wanted jobs [CBO, pp. 2-31].

Few expect this situation to change quickly. As one recent report on the problem points out, "the causes of youth unemployment are many, and . . . no simple solutions to the problem exist [HR Report No. 96-1034, p. 4]." There is a widespread belief, however, that existing federal youth employment programs can be made more effective.

The key, many argue, is achieving greater coordination between the job training agencies and educational institutions. In the words of the House Committee on Education and Labor: "the roots of the [youth unemployment] problem lie both in the labor market and in the educational system -- and in the lack of coordination and cooperation between the two [HR Report No. 96-1034, p. 4]." Yet, as this paper will demonstrate, the record of the last two decades indicates that improving coordination between job training agencies and educational institutions will be very difficult.

Changing Coordination Strategies

Pre-CETA. During the 1950's, the nation began to experience a new problem. While the economy was in high gear, sweeping changes in the structure of the economy were making it difficult for unskilled workers and disadvantaged youth to find steady employment. Fearing the consequences of this trend, social and economic reformers began to look for remedies.

Job training soon proved to be one of the most politically popular. From 1961 to 1970, federal outlays for job training programs and related services increased from an annual rate of less than $250 million to about $4 billion. Previously given only lip service, manpower training quickly became a key variable in national economic policymaking [Davidson, p. 2].

Prior to approval of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1973, the majority of federal job training funds were distributed under four statutes: (1) the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962; (2) the Vocational Education Act (VEA) of 1963; (3) the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964; and (4) the Appalachian Redevelopment Act (ARA) of 1965. With the exception of the VEA, all focused primarily on the economically and socially disadvantaged; all stressed on-the-job training and work experience over classroom instruction; and all placed high priority on short duration enrollments.

Control over these programs was hotly contested by three rival coalitions. One, led by the Department of Labor (DOL), tended to reflect the concerns of mayors, governors, employment security agencies, and labor unions. Another, closely aligned with the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), worked primarily on behalf of local anti-poverty

organizations and minority groups. And a third, working through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), focused mainly on the concerns of vocational education interests and state and local education agencies.

In an effort to placate each of these groups, Congress opted to split control over job training programs among the three agencies which spoke for their interests in Washington. The spoils, however, were not apportioned evenly but were divided roughly in proportion to the political strength of each group. DOL won the most; OEO came off second best; and HEW placed a distant third [Davidson, pp. 3-5].

Congress recognized, however, that none of these agencies was in a position to mobilize or organize all of the resources that might be needed by many program participants and attempted to compensate by enacting a wide range of mandates for interagency coordination. DOL, for example, had to receive HEW approval for all classroom instruction arrangements under MDTA [MDTA, 1971, sec. 204 (c)] and for all high school equivalency programs under Job Corps [EOA, 1971, sec. 108 (c)]. It was clear by the late 1960's, however, that these coordination mandates were not very effective. Duplication and gaps in service were widespread. The type of training offered was determined less by client needs than by narrow program objectives [Davidson, p. 5]. Waste and corruption were common.

Most studies of the period suggest that the coordination mandates of pre-CETA training programs failed for basically three reasons. First, the administration of all programs was so centralized in Washington that federal officials had little real basis for knowing what specific

types of coordination were really needed at the state and local level. Second, funds were distributed through so many specialized programs and contracts that the total system was virtually incomprehensible. And third, programmatic fragmentation was self-perpetuating [ACIR, A-58, pp. 3-8]. As each competing group gained new resources, turf battles multiplied. New resources not only bought more services but also ineluctably strengthened political bases [Davidson, pp. 6-8].

A consensus on a new coordination strategy did not emerge until 1973. Federal policymakers argued repeatedly over two issues: one was the amount of administrative authority that should be delegated to state and local jurisdictions; the other was the number of restrictions that should be attached to federal funds. Most congressional Democrats argued that programs should be controlled from Washington and that funds should be distributed through categorical grants. The Nixon Administration, in contrast, thought that most decisions should be made at the state and local level, and that revenues should be distributed through block grants.

It was difficult, however, to discuss these issues on their merits: too many divergent interests had too much at stake. Governors recognized that reorganization of manpower programs could help them in their effort to restore state governments to a pivotal role in the federal system. Mayors and neighborhood interests realized that reorganization could affect the battle over community control. Minority groups knew that reorganization might give them control of the resources they needed to play a stronger role in American politics at large.

Of all the interests that had an important role in manpower services, education was the only one that did not fully assert itself in

the reorganization debate. The U.S. Office of Education, for example, participated in the debate, but it was clear from the outset that it regarded the underlying issue -- improvement of job training programs -- as a low priority matter [Davidson, p. 4]. Similarly, the American Vocational Association and other education groups monitored the struggle from a distance, apparently accepting the view of HEW that reorganization would assist in making vocational education "more effective in meeting the manpower needs of our nation [Davidson, p. 51]."

CETA as First Enacted. State and local education agencies paid dearly for this complacency. Prior to CETA, they had a statutory monopoly over the provision of all vocational education services required under MDTA. Subsequently, job training agencies were empowered to purchase educational services wherever they saw fit. Moreover, job training agencies were exempted from having to comply with any established state educational standards.

CETA, however, did not forsake the goal of education-manpower coordination. Its underlying objective was to create a framework that could coordinate all manpower services -- education included. As enacted in 1973, CETA aimed to improve coordination among manpower services with two classic administrative remedies. One aimed at improving coordination by strengthening state-local leadership and by enhancing administrative flexibility. The other attempted to assure coordination through state-local adherence to national accountability standards.

State-local leadership and administrative flexibility were encouraged through a combination of programmatic decentralization and

decategorization. Primary control over federal manpower programs was shifted from Washington into the hands of state, county, and city governments designated by the Department of Labor (DOL) as "prime sponsors." Simultaneously, grantee discretion was greatly enhanced by shifting about one-third of all manpower funding into a single block grant [Mirengoff and Rindler, pp. 17-18] and, closely related, by abolishing all provisions which created presumptive suppliers of job training services [ACIR, A-58, pp. 34-35].

Nonetheless, CETA was far from the pure manpower revenue-sharing program wanted by the Nixon White House. To qualify for CETA funding, state and local prime sponsors had to comply with a wide range of procedural checks and balances, many of which were aimed directly at the problem of education-manpower coordination. Some of the most important included:

- a 5 percent set-aside of Title I funding to assist state vocational education agencies "to provide needed vocational education services in areas served by prime sponsors [CETA 1973, sec. 112(a)];
- a 4 percent set-aside of Title I funding to assist governors in developing comprehensive manpower plans which "provide for the cooperation and participation of all state agencies providing manpower and manpower-related services. . . [CETA 1973, sec. 106(b)(3)];
- a requirement holding all prime sponsors responsible for utilizing state vocational education agencies, local schools, and postsecondary educational institutions "after giving due consideration to the effectiveness of such services and facilities. . .[CETA 1973, sec. 105 (a)(3)(B)];
- a reciprocal exchange of representatives between the State Manpower Services Council (SMSC) and the State Advisory Council on Vocational Education (SACVE) [CETA 1973, sec. 107];
- mutual review of annual state plans by the SMSC and the SACVE [CETA 1972, sec. 107]; and,
- inclusion of education interests on each prime sponsor's planning council, where appropriate [CETA 1973, sec. 104].

The education community was not impressed. State education agencies, local school boards, and teacher groups all saw CETA as a direct threat to their authority, and especially so after the law was actually implemented. While CETA allowed state vocational education agencies to distribute 5 percent of Title I funds, it denied them the right to control the use of funds by their grantees. While CETA encouraged prime sponsors to use the public schools wherever appropriate, many prime sponsors seemed to bypass them summarily. While CETA encouraged prime sponsors to include educational interests on their planning councils, school officials frequently found themselves excluded or ignored [ACIR, A-58, p. 35].

CETA Since 1977. Congress responded to these objections in 1977 and 1978. Recognizing that cooperation of the education interests was critical to the success of any effort to reduce youth unemployment, federal lawmakers attempted to assuage their concerns in two ways. First, it greatly stepped up support for new and innovative approaches to the education linkage problem. Second, and closely related, it guaranteed vocational institutions greater access to CETA resources.

The first breakthrough on the education linkage issue occurred in 1977 with the passage of two new pieces of legislation, the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP) and the Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP)--each part of a larger umbrella bill, the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA).

Funded in fiscal 1980 at $115 million [see Table 1], YIEPP is administered by the Secretary of Labor and is intended to test the effects of giving youth a guaranteed part-time job in exchange for re-entering or

Table 1

Federal Financing (in $1000's) for CETA Programs by Title, Federal Fiscal Years 1977 to 1981

CETA TITLE	1977 Budget authority*	1977 Outlays	1978 Budget authority*	1978 Outlays	1979 Budget authority*	1979 Outlays	1980 estimated Budget authority*	1980 estimated Outlays	1981 proposed Budget authority*	1981 proposed Outlays
Total	12,736,830	5,631,307	3,440,930	9,533,079	10,296,876	9,443,244	8,120,293	8,926,237	10,395,000	10,329,000
Title II-A,B,C	1,880,000	1,756,209	1,880,000	1,992,317	1,914,100	1,801,550	2,054,000	1,948,000	2,117,000	2,011,000
Title II-D	1,540,000	495,693	...	994,830	2,500,930	1,755,641	1,485,000	2,015,750	2,554,000	2,437,000
Title III	1,195,730	837,104	1,143,930	971,542	378,796	543,598	528,678	621,861	651,000	686,000
Title IV	1,040,767	201,568	417,000	665,754	1,795,196	1,774,570	1,850,361	2,244,277	2,020,000	2,507,000
Job Corps	274,100	201,584	417,000	279,652	296,000	379,610	415,700	488,687	560,000	579,000
YETP	536,667	4	...	293,980	499,796	555,506	692,086	720,758	...	45,000
YCCIP	115,000	...	...	60,490	107,100	103,366	134,008	147,148	...	20,000
YIEPP	115,000	...	...	31,632	107.100	76,568	...	94,000	...	158,000
SYEP	115,000	...	...	...	785,200	659,520	608,567	793,684	839,000	872,000
Youth Initiative	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,125,000	932,000
Title VI	6,847,000	2,340,409	...	4,769,404	3,404,424	3,285,210	1,627,000	1,926,000	2,044,000	1,978,000
Title VII	...	...	...	...	75,000	9,507	325,000	164,000	150,000	309,000
Title VIII	233,333	40	...	139,226	228,430	273,168	250,254	256,139	265,000	277,000
Other	...	264	...	...	...	...	...	...	90,000	124,000

Sources: U. S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, "CETA and CSEOA Appropriations and Outlays by Title, FY 1974 through FY 1978" (mimeo), October 10, 1979. U. S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, "FY 1979 Final Obligations and Outlays" (mimeo), undated. National Governors' Association, Legisline. March 5, 1980.

* Or "such sums available"

staying in school. All YIEPP participants must be between the ages of 16 and 19, participate in a secondary school diploma program, and must be guaranteed up to 20 hours of employment a week for a minimum of 6 months. By design, however, YIEPP operates only in 17 prime sponsor areas, all selected on a competive basis and all ranging widely in size, unemployment rates, school dropout rates, and urban status.

Like YIEPP, YETP is designed to test the efficacy of closer CETA-school linkages. YETP, however, is a much larger program and subordinates the education linkage objective to a more immediate purpose of simply supplying jobs to disadvantaged teenagers. Funded in fiscal 1980 at $692 million, YETP serves unemployed youth between the ages of 14 and 21 and apportions its funding as follows: 20 percent for national discretionary and set-aside programs supervised by the Secretary of Labor; 5 percent for statewide youth services run by governors; and 75 percent for employment and training services supervised by local prime sponsors.

YETP's education linkage mandates for its state and national programs are relatively weak. Governors can meet the letter of the law by complying with such general mandates as "providing for the establishment of cooperative efforts between State and local institutions" in such areas as guidance and counselling [CETA 1979, sec. 433 (c)(4)]. Similarly, the Secretary of Labor is mandated to do little more than consult with the Secretary of Education on matters of mutual concern and to establish cooperative arrangements with educational institutions wherever "appropriate" [CETA 1979, sec. 438].

Under YETP, the main burden for education linkages falls on local prime sponsors. Unlike any other CETA program, local sponsors must

use at least 22 percent of all revenues derived from YETP for cooperative service agreements with public schools. Furthermore, all local sponsors must assure that any YETP work experience program for in-school youth will

- supply jobs which are relevant to the participants' educational and career goals;
- advise participants about other training resources such as vocational education; and,
- receive the approval of the local youth council, an advisory body which, by case, must grant representation to education interests [(YEDPA, sec. 345(c)].

Nonetheless, YETP does not treat prime sponsors and local education agencies as equals. Prime sponsors are free to allocate educational set-aside funds among local education agencies as they see fit, and they retain veto power over the content of all service agreements. Indeed, all arrangements can be non-financial. Once service agreements are negotiated, all bills can be paid by local sponsors and without any cash transfer to schools.

YETP, however, set an important precedent which was subsequently expanded. Under continuing pressure from the education community, Congress in 1978 increased CETA's vocational education set-aside from 5 percent of old Title I to 6 percent of the funding under Parts A, B, and C of new Title II [CETA 1979, sec. 202 (a)(1)(C)(d)]. Additionally, it created a new set-aside which gives governors 1 percent of Title II (Parts A, B, C, D) funding for "encouraging coordination and establishing linkages between prime sponsors and appropriate educational agencies . . . [CETA 1979, sec 202 (a)(1)(C)(d)]." Thus, as a result the youth amendments of 1977 and 1978, the value of CETA's mandated educational set-asides rose

in just two years from $94 to $269 million or almost 200 percent.

It would be incorrect to conclude, however, that all recent efforts to improve CETA-education linkages have been instigated by education interests. The issue of academic credit for work experience is a case in point. From the early 1960's, employment and training agencies found repeatedly that most state and local education agencies were reluctant to give academic credit for experience gained in manpower training programs. Frustrated by their inability to make much headway on the issue with state and local officials, manpower interests began to press federal policymakers to adopt legislation which would mandate the public schools to recognize the academic value of work experience programs.

After extensive debate, Congress finally attempted to deal with the academic credit issue in YEDPA. Since 1977, all federal manpower programs aimed at youth including YIEPP and YETP must make "appropriate efforts . . . to encourage the grant of . . . academic credit [for work experience] to eligible participants who are in school [CETA, 1979, sec. 445 (a)]." YEDPA, however, makes a pronounced bow to state and local control over education by abjuring any national academic credit standards. It merely requires that the Secretary of Labor:

> shall work with the Department of [Education] to make suitable arrangements with appropriate State and local education officials whereby academic credit may be awarded, consistant with applicable state law . . . [CETA 1979, sec. 445 (b)]."

In the same vein, it would be equally incorrect to conclude that all recent changes in CETA coordination mandates have been politically beneficial to education interests. Local school boards, for example, have made a concerted effort to limit CETA's support for educational programs run by community based organizations. Thus far, however, they

have been only partially successful. Nothing demonstrates this better than YETP's provisions governing the award of grants for DOL's discretionary projects for innovative programs. While educational institutions are eligible, they clearly are given low priority. By law, first consideration must be given to community based organizations.

Summary

Over the last two decades, federal policymakers have made repeated efforts to promote coordination between education and manpower programs. Prior to the enactment of CETA, they attempted to achieve coordination by a series of "top-down" mandates which gave state vocational education agencies a major role in governing and operating all vocational education services required by local manpower programs. In sharp contrast, the initial version of CETA attempted to achieve coordination through a "bottom-up" strategy which allowed manpower agencies the right to operate educational programs in whatever ways they saw fit.

State and local education agencies and other education interests, however, regarded this as a major assault on their established authority and demanded revisions in CETA which would give them a larger role in providing the educational services required by manpower programs. Congress responded to their demands in 1977 and 1978 by amending CETA with a series of compromise measures which allowed manpower agencies to retain full authority over the governance of CETA programs while giving state and local education agencies an assured role in the provision of educational services needed by manpower clients.

Thus, in fiscal 1980, CETA's mandated financial set-asides for educational agencies and institutions were as follows:

Title I — Administrative Provisions

- Budget Authority: Such sums as necessary
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title II -- Comprehensive Employment and Training Services

Parts A, B, C — Services, Upgrading and Retraining

- Budget Authority: $2,054 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside:

  (1) Governors' grants for vocational education: 6 percent of funds available or $123 million [CETA, 1979, sec. 202 (a)(1)(C)(b)].

  (2) Governors' grants for prime sponsor-education linkages: 1 percent of funds available under Parts A, B, C, and D (see below), or $35 million [CETA, 1979, sec 202 (a)(1)(C)(d)]

Part D -- Transitional Employment Opportunities

- Budget Authority: $1,485 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title III — Special Federal Responsibilities

- Budget Authority: $529 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title IV — Youth Programs

Part A — Youth Employment Demonstration Programs

- Budget Authority: $826 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $114 million

  Comment: Set-aside equals a minimum of 22 percent of sums available to local prime sponsors under YETP [CETA 1979, sec. 433 (d)(1)]

Title IV — Youth Programs, continued

Part B -- Job Corps

- Budget Authority: Such sums as necessary
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Part C -- Summer Youth Program

- Budget Authority: Such sums as necessary
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title V -- National Commission for Employment Policy

- Budget Authority: Such sums as necessary
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title VI -- Countercyclical Public Service Employment

- Budget Authority: $1,627 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title VII -- Private Sector Opportunities for Disadvantaged

- Budget Authority: $325 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

Title VIII -- Young Adult Conservation Corps

- Budget Authority: $250 million
- Mandated Educational Set-Aside: $0

EDUCATION-MANPOWER COORDINATION SINCE 1977

Congressional fascination with education-manpower coordination is not difficult to understand. It holds out the hope of a more effective and more efficient attack on the youth unemployment problem. It leaves established political institutions intact. And, properly executed, it enables Washington to shift some of the cost of operating manpower programs from the federal treasury to the budgets of state and local education agencies and other educational institutions.

But will the current coordination strategy work? Will it eliminate needless friction between education and manpower programs? Will it help education and manpower agencies work together in greater harmony? Will it change and improve the quality of youth employment and training? Will it translate into a significant restructuring of the education and manpower service delivery systems?

At this point, it is impossible to answer any of these questions definitively. The CETA amendments of 1977 and 1978 have been in operation for too little time to permit a full assessment of their effects. Nonetheless, there is a mounting body of evidence which supports three important provisional conclusions:

- CETA agencies and educational institutions are moving rapidly toward a form of administrative detente; administrative linkages between the two "camps" have expanded in many cases well beyond the minimum required by law.

- Improved administrative linkages have not translated into a significant restructuring of education and manpower service delivery systems; thus far, most educational institutions have treated CETA programs as "add-ons" which are not integrated within their basic operating structure. Similarly, many CETA agencies have not treated educational institutions as equal partners, but as hired hands.

- While there is reason to believe that administrative relations between CETA programs and educational institutions will improve, it is difficult to imagine that either side will be able or inclined to support widespread integration of their service delivery systems without significant revisions in current federal legislation.

Administrative Detente Through a Fiscal Lens

The signs of administrative detente between education and manpower agencies are numerous. Some of the most commonly cited include:

- expanding collaboration on coordination issues between the Departments of Education and Labor [DOL/HEW; Taggart; Wurzburg, 1979];
- increasing involvement of state and local education officials in the planning of CETA programs [USCoM];
- expanding interaction between education and manpower officials outside of formal channels [Pro-Action];
- increasing interchange of statistical data between education and manpower programs [DOL/HEW]; and,
- mounting interlocking memberships on CETA and vocational education review panels [Pro-Action].

The most tangible measure of administrative detente, however, is the increasing magnitude of fiscal linkages between CETA agencies and educational institutions. The year CETA was first implemented, economic ties between CETA agencies and educational institutions probably totalled less than $400 million. Perhaps up to $300 million came from service agreements negotiated with prime sponsors. And at least $79 million additional would have come from the 5 percent vocational education set-aside under Title I [USCoM, p. 59].

Today, economic transactions between CETA agencies and institutions providing educational services probably total between $1.1 and $1.5 billion. Admittedly, this is a wide range. At this point, however, CETA's financial

information system renders more precise estimates impossible. While the system collects a large amount of financial data, all expenditures are reported solely on a function and object basis (see Chart 1). While these data reveal CETA agency outlays for one important educational service, classroom training, they do not disclose how much is spent on all educational services. And equally important, they do not show how much is spent by type of contractor. Data for public schools, community based organizations, proprietary institutions, and other agencies are all lumped together except under the educational set-aside programs of Title II and the youth programs of Title IV. The dissaggregated data for Titles II and IV, however, are available only for "in-school" outlays (expenditures on services to students attending public school) prior to the current fiscal year. Starting this year, DOL will no longer collect data on "in-school" spending because, in the words of one DOL official, "No one uses it."

Our estimate of CETA-education linkages is based on fragmentary data from several different sources and on two different types of econonomic transactions: (1) contracts for educational services purchased by prime sponsors; and (2) placements of CETA public service workers in educational institutions.

The Value of Purchased Services: All Titles. Research conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCoM) suggests that most CETA agencies rely on educational institutions for essentially one service — classroom training. In a survey of 42 prime sponsors conducted during fiscal 1978, USCoM found that almost 85 percent of all prime sponsor spending for educational services purchased from public schools went for basic education,

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training Administration

CETA
FINANCIAL STATUS REPORT

1. GRANTEE'S NAME AND ADDRESS

2. FED. AGENCY | 3. FEDERAL GRANT NO.

4. PROJECT PERIOD (From - To)

5. REPORT PERIOD (From - To)

6. TYPE OF PROGRAM ("X" one)
☐ II-B,C ☐ III ☐ II-D ☐ IV ☐ VII ☐ VI ☐ Other

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Co	Prog. Code	Reg.	St.	F. Y.	Project Number	Subj. Proj. No.	Comp Code	Q or F	REPORT PER M M	REPORT PER Y Y
1 2 3	4 5	6 7	8 9	10 11	12 13 14 15 16 17 18		19 20	21	22 23	24 25

7. STATUS OF FUNDS	A. Total Federal Share of Program Outlays	B. Federal Share of Unliquidated Obligations	C. Total Federal Share of Outlays and Unliquidated Obligations	D. Total Federal Funds Authorized	E. % of Plan Accomplished
Co	26				
1. Classroom Training					
2. On-the-Job Training	37				
3. PSE: Non-Projects a. Wages/Fringes	48				
b. Projects Wages/Fringes	59				
c. Training/Services for 3a and 3b	70				
4. Work Experience	26				
5. Services to Participants	37				
6. Other Activities	48				
7. Career Employment Experience	59				
8. Transition Services	70				
9. Vocational Exploration Program	26				
10. Entitlement	37				
11. Total CETA Funds	48				
12. Non-Federal Share of Program Outlays	59				
13. Upgrading	70				
14. Retraining	26				

COMMENTS

8. INDIRECT EXPENSE

a. Type of Rate ("X" one)
☐ Provisional ☐ Fixed ☐ Predetermined ☐ Final

b. Rate | c. Base

d. Total Amount $

e. Federal Share

9. AVERAGE ANNUALIZED WAGE RATE (PSE)
$. F 9 56

10. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY

	Financial a. Total	Financial b. YETP In-School	c. Total Participants Served
	26	26	
A. Total Carry-In			
B. Accrued Expenditures (Yr. to Date)	37	37	
1. Administration	48	48	
2. Allowances	59	59	26
3. Wages	70	70	31
4. Fringe Benefits	26	26	36
5. Worksite Supervision	37	37	41
6. Training	48	48	46
7. Services	59	59	51

11. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that to the best of my knowledge and belief that this report is correct and complete and that all outlays and unpaid obligations are for the purposes set forth in the grant agreement.

NAME

TITLE | PHONE NO.

SIGNATURE | DATE SUBMITTED

ETA 2219 (Apr. 1979)

pre-employment training, skill training, or some other form of classroom preparation (see Table 2). Arrangements for other services like counselling and job placement were made on a fairly widespread basis, but the amount of funding involved usually was very small.

During fiscal 1980, CETA outlays on classroom training including participant stipends are about $800 million (see Table 3.) Thus, if USCoM's findings from fiscal 1978 still apply, CETA agreements for educational services would have a total value of about $1 billion. It should be remembered, however, that USCoM's findings pre-date implementation of YETP, a program which requires all in-school service agreements to supplement any classroom training with at least four so-called "transition services" -- i.e. non-instructional assistance such as counselling, transportation, outreach, and child care. Accordingly, it is possible that the actual figure may be even higher.

It should not be assumed, however, that these services are provided solely to school-age youth or through agreemeents with local education agencies. Except for participants in Title IV youth programs, about three-fourths of all persons enrolled in CETA programs are age 20 or over (see Table 4) -- well beyond normal school age. Closely related, fragmentary data suggest that between 30 and 50 percent of all CETA outlays for educational services involve agencies other than the public schools (USCoM, pp. 21-22].

The Value of Purchased Services: Titles II and IV. Hard data on CETA economic linkages with the public schools are currently limited to the educational set-aside programs of Title II and the youth programs of Title IV. During fiscal 1979, CETA service agreements for services to youth

Table 2

Percentage Distribution of Vocational Education and Training Services Purchased From Institutions Public Schools, Surveyed by U.S. Conference of Mayors, Fiscal 1978

Service	Average distribution of CETA funds*
Classroom Training	85.8%
Basic education	(5.6)
Pre-employment training	(6.5)
Skill training	(72.5)
Other	(1.2)
Other Services	14.2
Public service employment	(1.7)
Counseling	(3.1)
Job placement development	(2.0)
Administration	(6.3)
Other	(1.1)
N=40	

*Excludes 22 percent set-aside.

Source: Compiled from information in U.S. Conference of Mayors, CETA Vocational Education Coordination, A Status Report, November 1979.

Table 3

Expenditures for and Participants Receiving Classroom Training under Selected CETA Programs, October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Totals

Program	Classroom training	
	Expenditures	Participants
Title II		
Parts A,B,C,		
Prime Sponsors	$ 611,669,861	427,733
Voc. ed. set-asides	86,490,943	n.a.
Linkages set-aside	467,065	n.a.
Part D	13,404,524	14,496
Title III		
Part A	5,169,954	7,921
Title IV		
Part A	56,116,348	48,884
Parts B,C	17,592,059	41,644
Title VI	5,582,383	8,035

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

Table 4

Age Structure of CETA Participants by Selected Program Areas, October 1978 to September 1979

Legislative Part	Percent of Total		
	Under 16	16 to 19	Over 19
Title II			
Parts A,B,C	6.4	28.0	65.6
Vocational education	1.8	22.9	75.3
Education Linkages	4.6	22.5	72.9
Part D	0.2	10.4	89.4
Title III			
Indians	3.3	19.7	77.0
Migrants	16.3	12.0	71.7
Title IV			
Primes' YETP	14.3	76.1	9.6
Govs' YETP	15.6	72.8	11.6
YCCIP	0.6	96.9	2.5
SPEDY	39.9	55.2	4.6
Other	17.1	79.8	3.1
Title VI	0.2	9.6	90.2

attending local education agencies totalled slightly over $300 million (see Tables 5 and 6). And as has been widely observed, this expenditure level is well above the minimum required by law. It must be stressed, however, that public schools may not have actually received more than a small part of these funds. About 40 percent of all agreements for in-school services are, in CETA parlance, "non-financial" -- that is, prime sponsors pay for services without turning over any cash to school authorities [Kirschner, p. 22]. Moreover, in about 30 percent of all agreements, public schools serve simply as financial middlemen, taking cash from prime sponsors and passing it on to other providers of educational services [Kirschner, p. ii].

Gains from Public Service Employment. Importantly, schools also may receive substantial benefits from CETA's public service employment organizations. In early 1978, the National Commission on Manpower Policy reported that city and county prime sponsors were allocating about 7 percent of all public service employment positions to school districts [NCoMP, p. 33]. Assuming this percentage held true for fiscal 1979, the cash equivalent value of these positions would have been at least $250 million and might have reached over $300 million. It is important to recognize, however, that this excludes the value of any public service employment that is bestowed on school districts through indirect channels.

There are at least three other ways that CETA's public service employment programs indirectly benefit local school systems. First, CETA prime sponsors sometimes assign public service employment positions to non-educational agencies with the understanding that the personnel will be used to provide services to the public schools. One large eastern city, for example, assigned public service positions to a non-profit arts

Table 5

CETA Funds Reported by U. S. Department of Labor to Support the Administration and Delivery of In-School Services for CETA-Eligible Youth, October 1978 to September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected States

State	CETA funds supporting administration and delivery of in-school services in $1000's			
	Title II obligation		Title IV expenditures	
	Governor's grants for vocational education	CETA - education system Linkages	YETP	other
U.S. Total	113,197.8	29,755.5	150,511.6	9,947.9
Alabama	1,942.8	n.r.	1,697.4	0.0
California	12,641.7	4,779.8	13,813.9	0.0
Illinois	4,946.6	1,959.9	11,191.5	983.0
Kentucky	1,598.2	n.r.	2,866.7	0.0
Maryland	1,020.4	8.8	3,494.9	0.0
Michigan	5,285.8	2,003.4	10,581.1	0.0
New York	10,629.6	n.r.	10,032.3	121.9
North Carolina	2,865.8	n.r.	1,358.3	0.0
Ohio	5,146.0	1,981.0	3,984.1	8.7
Pennsylvania	6,156.4	n.r.	9,416.1	0.0
Rhode Island	587.2	228.7	774.9	0.0
Washington	2,111.5	800.9	3,252.5	0.0

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration QPR and CETA Desk Review (January 1980).

n.r. Not reported.

Table 6

Allocation of Funds Between In-School and Other Activities Under the CETA Title IV Youth Employment and Training Program, YETP), October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected States*

State	Funds in $1000's		Expenditures allocated to in-school activities b/	
	Available a/	Expended b/	Amount in $1000's	Percent of total
U.S. Total	508,603.0	351,183.9	142,383.7	40.5
Alabama	8,293.6	6,115.1	1,697.4	27.8
California	53,165.7	36,246.6	13,625.6	37.6
Illinois	21,711.0	16,440.1	11,191.5	68.1
Kentucky	6,786.1	5,320.8	2,866.7	53.9
Maryland	8,020.6	6,065.9	3,494.9	57.6
Michigan	20,160.7	17,763.7	10,361.9	58.3
New York	69,919.1	16,476.1 c/	8,345.5 c/	50.7 e/
North Carolina	10,026.7	8,327.3	3,882.7	46.6
Ohio	21,115.6	15,267.0	3,984.1	26.1
Pennsylvania	28,242.8	21,444.8	8,778.9	40.9
Rhode Island	2,142.2	1,991.8	683.0	34.3
Washington	8,488.3	7,311.1	3,252.5	44.5

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, QPR and CETA Desk Review (computer printout), March 21, 1980. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Youth Program YETP Component--September 1979 (computer printout), undated.

*These data should be used with caution. Owing to missing data, reported state totals may be less than actual amounts. Figures exclude any YETP activities supported with governors' grants.

a/ Planned

b/ Actual

c/ No data reported for New York City.

organization which, in turn, was required to provide the schools special ballet programs.

Second, municipal governments almost certainly use public service workers to assist in performing services for educational institutions. In many cities, school services like transportation, health, and libraries are not actually a part of the educational budget, but the general municipal budget.

Third, and perhaps most important of all, the availability of public service workers to city and county governments may indirectly free-up local tax revenues for use by educational institutions. It appears, for example, that city and county governments use about one-fifth of their public service employment slots as substitutes for positions that would otherwise be funded with other revenues [NCoMP, pp. 34-38]. As a result, they are able to save at least $600 million which can be used for other purposes, and it is difficult to imagine that this does not eventually have some spillover effect on school budgets.

While there are no definitive data, declining federal budget authority for public service employment suggests that school districts probably received their maximum benefit from Title II-D and Title VI in fiscal 1979. If prime sponsors gave school districts the same share of public service employment positions in 1980 as in 1979, the cash equivalent value of the transfer would have fallen to from $290 million to about $180 million. And owing to anticipated cuts in public service employment funds by the Congress, the value would drop even further during fiscal 1981. Indeed, it is possible that cuts in the federal budget may result in a sort of reverse "multiplier effect." That is, as county and city prime sponsors

receive less public service employment funding, one would suspect that they might be strongly inclined to minimize any adverse effect on themselves by cutting back disproportionately on slots allocated to other agencies.

Cutbacks in public service employment probably will impact on educational institutions very unevenly. As a general rule, educational institutions are not highly dependent on public service workers. Compared to counties and cities, school districts substitute CETA workers for employees paid with other funds at a relatively low rate. As one big city superintendent told us recently, "They are nice to have, but we could easily live without them." Yet, it is likely that some school districts will not be so fortunate. In Ohio, for example, it appears that some school districts now support a very high percentage of their maintenance personnel wholly with funds from CETA [Harrison].

The Gap Between Detente and Integration

Shortly before YEDPA was enacted in 1977, DOL offered the following prediction:

> [T]he mandate for a local education agency (LEA) - CETA agreement will not by itself achieve educational reform or a significant restructuring of service delivery system [Wurzburg, p.5].

And events, thus far, have borne out this view.

While manpower agencies and educational institutions have expanded their administrative and financial relationships, there has been little progress toward actual integration of service activities, and this can be seen in at least three ways: (1) limited progress toward mutual funding of CETA-school activities; (2) scant prime sponsor use of public schools for

instruction in basic educational skills; and (3) the low propensity of schools to award academic credit for work experience.

Mutual Funding. Pooled financial support for CETA youth programs is rare. While many recognize that "the pattern of funding can determine how successfully job or career training can be integrated [into school programs]" [Minnesota, p. 14], it appears that most local education agencies operate CETA training programs exclusively with CETA dollars. Indeed, a local match seems rare even in programs generally thought to be exemplary. One recent study of exemplary programs, for example, found a local match in only one-program-out-of-five (see Appendix Table 1).

Furthermore, many believe that the future of school interest in manpower linkages will depend to a great extent on the continuation of CETA funding. In the words of one study, most program operators regard education linkage revenues "as but one more source of funding [Youthwork, 1978, p. xiii]." This posture, however, may say more about the high degree of uncertainty surrounding CETA funding than about schools' attitude toward manpower linkages.

Dependence on Schools for Instruction in Basic Skills. Just as schools have been slow to match CETA funds with resources of their own, CETA agencies have demonstrated little enthusiasm for drawing on schools' educational services. While financial linkages between CETA and the schools have expanded greatly, most of the resources involved are used for participant stipends. In the words of one prominent manpower research organization, "As a rule, these programs do not capitalize on the unique capacities of schools . . . [NCoEP, p. iii]."

The great majority of in-school expenditures under YETP, for example,

are not allocated to education, but to the support of participant incomes. During fiscal 1979, for example, about 63 cents out of every dollar spent on in-school services under YETP went for participant wages and benefits. Only 30 cents was spent on teaching, training, or support services, and the balance went to program administration. And importantly, inspection of 12 diverse states and 27 of their prime sponsors reveals very little deviation from these norms (see Tables 7 and 8). Non-wage/administrative expenditures were well above average (i.e., exceeded 50 cents out of every dollar spent) in only one state -- North Carolina -- and in only four local areas -- Detroit, Toledo, Buffalo and Chicago.

Academic Credit. CETA agencies and schools also seem almost as far from solving the academic credit problems as at the time YEDPA was first enacted. While both sides have demonstrated a willingness to consider the problem, while service agreements on academic credit have been in a state of change [Youthwork, 1980, p. xv.], the number of youth program participants receiving academic credit is very small. In 1979, youth programs reported that only about 39,000 enrollees earned scholastic credit for their work experience or on-the-job training. This was only about 3 percent of all persons enrolled in these programs and not more than 15 percent of the CETA enrollees benefiting from in-school expenditures (see Table 9). These ratios, however, varied substantially by types of CETA program and by state and local areas.

Academic credit was awarded most frequently to participants in YETP. About 7 percent of the enrollment received academic credit in YETP program funding by prime sponsors, and slightly over 6 percent obtained academic credit in YETP programs supported through grants from governors. In contrast, academic credit was awarded to only about 2 percent of the

Table 7

Estimated Percentage Distribution of In-School Expenditures by Function Under the CETA Title IV Youth Employment and Training Program, October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected States*

State	Total	Percent of in-school funds expended on: Administration	Allowances	Wages and benefits	Worksite supervision	Training	Services
U.S. Total	100.0	10.0	4.6	56.6	1.1	7.3	20.5
Alabama	100.0	5.2	0.0	73.0	0.0	1.8	20.0
California	100.0	10.0	4.5	61.4	1.0	3.3	19.8
Illinois	100.0	6.8	12.6	57.7	0.1	5.9	16.7
Kentucky	100.0	12.1	0.4	72.6	0.0	6.8	8.2
Maryland	100.0	6.7	4.3	56.4	4.1	14.3	14.0
Michigan	100.0	1.1	0.5	78.7	0.0	0.0	20.1
New York	100.0	10.9	2.4	62.4	3.4	4.3	16.5
North Carolina	100.0	7.6	0.3	22.8	0.0	9.4	60.1
Ohio	100.0	20.3	0.2	42.8	0.0	9.3	27.3
Pennsylvania	100.0	9.6	3.3	53.1	0.6	11.3	22.0
Rhode Island	100.0	13.1	13.2	43.0	0.0	9.3	21.4
Washington	100.0	9.5	4.7	64.8	0.0	2.5	21.1

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, QPR and CETA Desk Review (computer printout), March 21, 1980.

*Estimates are based on actual expenditures reported for the period between October 1979 and June 1979, and planned expenditures reported for the period between July 1979 and September 1979.

Table 8

Planned Percentage Distribution of In-School Expenditures by Function Under the CETA Title IV Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP), October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected Cities*

Cities	Total	Percent of in-school funds expended on: Administration	Allowances	Wages and benefits	Worksite supervision	Training	Services
U.S. Total	100.0	7.2	4.7	58.5	1.1	7.7	20.8
Baltimore**	100.0	2.3	7.9	60.5	0.0	14.1	15.2
Birmingham**	100.0	3.0	0.9	79.2	0.0	0.0	17.7
Buffalo	100.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	77.5	0.0	13.4
Charlotte	100.0	7.2	0.0	79.4	0.0	8.6	4.7
Chicago	100.0	1.5	0.0	34.8	0.0	13.7	50.1
Cincinnati	100.0	19.7	0.0	80.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cleveland**	100.0	3.0	0.0	64.0	0.0	21.0	12.0
Columbus**	100.0	6.7	0.0	75.9	0.0	0.0	17.3
Dayton	100.0	17.5	1.2	58.7	0.0	1.4	21.2
Detroit	100.0	2.6	0.0	34.6	0.0	2.3	60.5
Long Beach	100.0	9.9	0.0	69.8	0.0	0.0	20.3
Los Angeles	100.0	9.3	0.0	71.5	0.0	1.1	18.1
Louisville	100.0	7.2	0.0	61.8	0.0	20.8	10.3
New York	100.0	14.3	0.0	65.0	0.0	3.9	16.8
Oakland	100.0	5.2	30.4	46.0	0.0	0.0	18.3
Philadelphia	100.0	4.7	1.1	67.8	0.0	3.8	22.6
Pittsburgh	100.0	5.5	0.0	69.9	0.0	3.6	20.9
Providence	100.0	9.5	27.4	32.3	0.0	0.6	30.1
Rochester	100.0	8.9	0.0	64.6	0.0	0.0	26.4
Sacramento	100.0	5.2	0.0	60.7	0.0	0.0	34.1
San Diego**	100.0	13.3	0.0	62.4	0.0	0.1	24.3
San Francisco	100.0	8.2	0.0	68.1	3.8	0.0	19.9
Seattle**	100.0	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
Spokane	100.0	9.1	0.4	58.7	0.0	6.7	25.1
Syracuse	100.0	0.0	15.7	74.8	0.0	0.0	9.4
Tacoma	100.0	8.6	4.5	57.5	0.0	4.9	24.5
Toledo**	100.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	96.8

Table 8 (continued)

Planned Percentage Distribution of In-School Expenditures by Function
Under the CETA Title IV Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP),
October 1978 through September 1979,
U.S. Total and Selected Cities*

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, QPR and CETA Desk Review (computer printout), March 21, 1980.

*Figures exclude any activities supported with governor' grants.

**This municipality encompasses an area smaller than the boundaries of its CETA local prime sponsor. The data shown are for the local prime sponsor. National summary data on the CETA program cannot be disaggregated below the local prime sponsor.

Table 9

Participants in CETA Title IV Youth Programs Except Job Corps Receiving Academic Credit for On-the-Job Training and Work Experience, October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected States*

State	Participants Total**	Participants receiving academic credit for work experience or on-the-job training: Number	Percent of Total
U.S. Total	1,260,545	38,619	3.1
Alabama	17,586	343	1.9
California	100,303	6,080	6.1
Illinois	67,058	714	1.1
Kentucky	22,092	234	1.1
Maryland	21,119	1,678	7.9
Michigan	53,640	2,029	3.8
New York	95,391	1,824	1.9
North Carolina	42,054	384	0.9
Ohio	59,008	4,613	7.8
Pennsylvania	60,338	1,228	2.0
Rhode Island	5,364	60	1.1
Washington	18,701	1,478	7.9

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration QPR and CETA Desk Review (microfiche) January 1980.

* Figures may be distorted by missing data and should be interpreted cautiously.

** In-school and other programs combined.

participants in YCCIP and to under 1 percent of the enrollment in all other Title IV youth programs except Job Corps. Again, however, it must be emphasized that these proportions are based on the total number of participants in these programs and not on the number of participants enrolled in in-school programs. Assuming again that the division of participants between in-school and other programs is proportional to the amount of CETA support going to educational institutions, it would be possible to argue that the share of in-school participants receiving academic credit through YETP may approach 20 percent.

Not surprisingly, the greatest variation in participant receipt of academic credit occurs at the local level. Out of 27 urban prime sponsors examined, 4 indicated that the proportion of YETP enrollees earning academic credit was fairly high (i.e., about 40 percent or more). Pittsburgh was the clear leader, reporting that academic credit went to about 82 percent of all YETP participants. Baltimore, San Diego, and Toledo all reported figures of about 40 percent. Several prime sponsors, however, reported figures under 5 percent, and for a plurality of cases it is impossible to reach any conclusion at all owing to the failure of the prime sponsor to forward the necessary data (see Table 10).

Causes of Weak Linkages

Most research argues that the current state of CETA-school linkages is a result of one or more of the following:

- the short amount of time that CETA and school personnel have had to implement recent CETA coordination mandates;
- deficiencies in established coordination requirements which require further legislative attention; and
- characteristics of manpower agencies and schools which probably cannot be changed by coordination alone.

Table 10

YETP Participants Receiving GED Certificates and Academic Credit for On-the-Job Training and Work Experience, October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected Cities*

Cities	YETP Participants	YETP Participants Receiving Academic Credit		YETP Participants Earning GED	
		Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total
U.S. Total	371,100	26,463	7.1	5,010	1.3
Baltimore**	3,662	1,447	39.5	26	0.7
Birmingham**	648	—	—	—	—
Buffalo	545	20	3.7	27	5.0
Charlotte	356	50	14.0	16	4.5
Chicago		—	—	—	—
Cincinnati	694	—	—	—	—
Cleveland**	2,037	493	24.2	96	4.7
Columbus**	1,554	—	—	—	—
Dayton	782	—	—	—	—
Detroit	1,345	28	2.1	68	5.1
Long Beach	451	—	—	—	—
Los Angeles	4,728	—	—	—	—
Louisville	504	—	—	—	—
New York	n.a.	—	—	—	—
Oakland	682	—	—	7	1.0
Philadelphia	2,142	—	—	—	—
Pittsburgh	637	520	81.6	34	5.3
Providence	343	0	0.0	38	11.1
Rochester	689	—	—	—	—
Sacramento	1,153	—	—	—	—
San Diego**	2,307	917	39.7	328	14.2
San Francisco	1,307	6	0.4	12	0.9
Seattle**	2,524	683	27.0	68	2.7
Spokane	427	44	10.3	2	0.5
Syracuse	393	—	—	—	—
Tacoma	909	32	3.5	—	—
Toledo**	8,649	3,521	40.7	—	—

Table 10 (continued)

YETP Participants Receiving GED Certificates and Academic Credit for On-the-Job Training and Work Experience, October 1978 through September 1979, U.S. Total and Selected Cities*

Sources: U.S. Depoartment of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, QPR and CETA Desk Review (microfiche) January, 1980.

** This municipality encompasses an area smaller than the boundaries of its CETA local prime sponsor. The data shown are for the local prime sponsor. National summary data on the CETA program cannot be disaggregated below the local prime sponsor.

Recency of Mandates. The "it's too early to tell" hypothesis has been echoed in virtually every major study of CETA implementation published since 1978. In the words of one:

> [C]hanges require time and patience. More precisely, they require subtle but constant pressure . . . and steady access and exposure to innovative . . . programs and models that appear effective . . . [Wurzburg, 1979, p. 30].

or as another study argues:

> That we have learned so little from our efforts over the past two decades ought not press us into seeking instantaneous results. These projects will need careful scrutiny, not to provide premature "outcome" data, but to learn what we can of implementation, of the trials of program start-up, and of how to slowly but confidently build the inter-institutional linkages necessary for program operation. The task is one of learning how to weave together the social net to be placed below youth as they make their way into adulthood and the world of work.

The call for more time to be certain, is not without merit. Experience indicates that almost any policy initiative is likely to face certain "teething" problems and CETA's school linkages mandates are no exception. Almost all efforts to improve working relationships between local manpower agencies and schools have been hampered by some or all of the following developmental difficulties.

- Lack of stable personnel structure in local manpower agencies. As one study points out, "The local CETA systems are . . . unstable organizationally. They have frequently attracted talented administrators, but have been unable to retain them . . . " [Wurzburg, p. 9].

- Lack of guidance in program design. During 1978, for example, YEDPA's mandate for "knowledge development" was virtually directionless. Nevertheless, most prime sponsors attempted to do something and the result was commonly chaotic. [NCoMP, p. vii].

- Lack of structure in service agreements. Reviews of prime sponsor - school service agreements show that they range in quality from "very good to disorganized [AIR, p. 13]." In a recent analysis of the Consolidated Youth Employment Program,

for example, the Technical Assistance and Training Corporation found that many agreements with public schools were "vague with regard to roles, responsibilities, goals, target populations, [AIR, p. 13]."

- Lack of information and understanding about rules and procedures. As the Youthwork National Policy Study points out, "In the early months . . . , many staff, especially those from educational systems, were unfamiliar with CETA regulations and reporting requirements . . . [and] lack of clarity in this area provided considerable tension . . . [Youthwork, 1978, p. xii].

- Lack of expertise. Personnel in many local schools and manpower agencies often know relatively little about the substantive problems that are likely to crop up in operating a comprehensive youth training system. In the words of one analyst, "Local expertise in employment and training affairs is [often] more political and managerial because grantsmanship and outguessing Congress and the Department of Labor are prerequisites for survival [Wurzburg, 1979, p. 9].

Fortunately, problems of this sort usually pass with time. The longer a legislative initiative is in effect, the greater the odds that it will be carried out by a bureaucracy that understands associated rules and procedures and that has the expertise needed to meet its general intent. Time, however, cannot provide a cure for intrinsic legislative defects.

Defects in Mandates. Owing in substantial measure to YEDPA's mandate for program monitoring, it is becoming increasingly evident that recent efforts to improve manpower education coordination have been repeatedly hampered by several shortcomings in CETA youth programs themselves. Some of the most important include:

- High uncertainty about the future of youth program funding. At the time Congress enacted CETA's youth initiatives, it built in doubts about their future by deciding to treat them as demonstration programs with only annual budget authority. Complicating matters further, the Carter Administration began to openly propose consolidating CETA's youth programs into a new Youth Act almost immediately after YEDPA was first implemented. Under these circumstances, local school authorities have been

left with no real alternative but to dismiss calls for investment in manpower training programs virtually out-of-hand.

- A mismatch between the planning cycle in public schools and in manpower training agencies. Owing to YEDPA's annual budget authority, manpower agencies are compelled to do much of their planning for youth programs not only on a short term basis, but also on a budget cycle that runs from October to September rather than on the July to June cycle common to public schools. As a result, schools are often asked to make commitments to manpower training without having any assurance that manpower agencies will be able to hold up their end of the bargain. And equally important, education authorities often find themselves having to make decisions about youth training programs only a few days before school opens in the fall -- a time when their workload tends to be extraordinary.

- The fragmentation of CETA programs. While CETA is commonly perceived as a block grant program, it is, in fact, highly fragmented into many separate programs. Thus, as schools and other educational institutions attempt to make use of CETA resources from diverse programs, they commonly find themselves dealing with a bureaucratic crazyquilt. Instead of dealing with a single linkage point, school officials must work with many, each with its own liaison person, its own contracting procedures [Governor's Employment and Training council, p. 33], and its own eligibility practices [NTS, p. 34].

- Lack of an authoritative coordination mechanism. Like all previous efforts at manpower-education coordination, the latest CETA youth initiatives fail to establish a truly authoritative coordination mechanism. Both manpower agencies and educational institutions remain basically sovereign creatures free to pursue their own self-interest. Thus, whenever CETA goals are much out of step with their respective agendas, none of the carrots or sticks in one existing set of coordination mandates is likely to prove very effective.

Underlying Problems. Indeed, the fundamental problem with CETA's coordination initiatives is that they fail to take into account several important realities of the state and local policymaking environment.

- First, it is exceedingly doubtful that federal manpower funding will have much effect on the priorities of state and local education agencies under today's climate of fiscal austerity. In real terms, the resources available for public education in most states have remained virtually constant

since 1975. Thus, if public schools are to make any permanent commitment to manpower training with their own resources, they will have no choice but to rob from Peter to pay Paul.

- Second and closely related, the call for greater public school involvement in manpower training programs comes at a time when public schools are under enormous pressure to comply with competing and more compelling federal mandates. While schools are free to accept or reject participation in CETA, they simply do not enjoy that luxury in other areas -- special education, bilingual education, desegregation to name only a few.

- Third, a high percentage of school districts with large numbers of CETA-eligible youth lack the internal administrative stability to seriously deal with the linkage question. Across the country, large urban school districts are in the throes of an unprecedented administrative crisis. While successful coordination usually depends on the presence of stable administrative leadership, the ranking administrations of many big city school districts now consider themselves to be lucky if they survive in their jobs two years. Important or minor, virtually any decision requires the consent of many different interests--each not only capable of imposing a veto, but also of causing decisionmaking paralysis.

- Fourth, the call for greater manpower-education coordination comes at a time when, in many instances, local school officials and mayors are locked in combat over the principle of school budget autonomy. Faced with an unprecedented fiscal crisis, many big city mayors are increasingly looking for ways to reduce the traditional fiscal independence of local schools. Thus, to expect coordination between education and manpower services typically under mayoral control is somewhat like asking the combatants in a civil war to sit down for high tea.

- Finally, school districts across the country are under enormous grassroots political pressure to "get back to the basics." And, among other things, this means avoid involvment in experiments. Yet by definition, CETA's youth programs are just that.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the last several years, working relationships between educational institutions and manpower agencies have improved in several respects. There is greater interagency communication on common problems. There is greater cooperation in planning. And there has been increased sharing of financial resources. These linkages, however, are in many respects very superficial. Most educational institutions continue to treat manpower training programs as little more than incidental appendages. Few have matched CETA dollars with resources of their own and few have made much progress in awarding academic credit for work experience. Similarly, most manpower agencies have made little effort to develop training programs with a strong basic educational component. While CETA outlays on educational services may appear impressive to the casual observer, close inspection reveals that the preponderant share of these expenditures is used for participant stipends and supportive services; the amount allocated to actual instructional services is very small.

While many argue that recent CETA-education coordination mandates should be given "more time," we can find little reason to believe that these requirements will be significantly more productive at any point in the foreseeable future than at present. More time will not make CETA youth funding more certain. More time will not eliminate the mismatch between CETA and school budget cycles. More time will not overcome problems stemming from the fragmentation of CETA programs. And most important of all, more time is unlikely to yield any material change in the state-local political environment in which CETA must operate.

But what are the alternatives? If political considerations require

continuation of the basic coordination strategy now in use, Congress must at the very least consider revising CETA in several key areas.

- The budget authority for CETA youth programs ought to be shifted from a one year to multi-year basis.
- The procedures which CETA agencies use in requesting services from educational institutions ought to be standardized across all programs.
- Current CETA reporting requirements ought to be modified in a manner that will provide more explicit information on the character of financial linkages with educational institutions. At the very least, the revised reporting system should disclose the following: (1) the aggregate value of educational linkages by type of institution; (2) the amount of funding dedicated to the purchase of classroom instruction in basic educational skills; and (3) the value of educational linkages for youth attending school on a full-time basis and for youth who are part-time students or drop-outs.

Ideally, however, Congress would be well-advised to completely rethink its current coordination strategy, and for at least two reasons. First, the experience of the last several years suggests that the ability of the federal government to leverage state and local education programs with small amounts of grant funding for manpower training is very limited. And so long as educational institutions are under tight taxing and spending limits, there is virtually no reason to expect that this will change.

Second, and closely related, the current coordination strategy provides very few incentives for organizational change. Prime sponsors continue to receive funding year-after-year virtually without regard to the quality of their programs. Educational institutions receive a substantial amount of their CETA funding not because they succeeded in preventing dropouts, but because they failed.

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APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1

Summary of Conserva's Findings on Selected Financial and Educational Characteristics of Exemplary CETA-LEA Service Agreements

State/LEA	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: Funds from Other Sources	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: In-Kind Contribution	Local education agency mandates participation of CETA youth in basic education skills programs
Alabama			
Birmingham	No	No	No
Gadsen	No	No	Yes
Montgomery	Yes	No	No
Arizona			
Flagstaff	No	No	No
Kingman	No	No	No
Phoenix	Yes	No	No
Tucson	Yes	No	No
Little Rock	Yes	No	(in Phase 36)
California			
Placentia	No	No	Undeterined
San Bruno	No	Yes	No
Colorado			
Colorado Springs	No	No	No
Denver	No	No	No
Connecticut			
Hartford	Yes	No	No
Delaware			
Wilmington	No	No	Yes
District of Columbia	No	No	Undetermined
Florida			
Sanford	No	No	No
Idaho			
American Falls	No	No	Yes

Appendix Table 1 (continued)

Summary of Conserva's Findings on Selected Financial and Educational Characteristics of Exemplary CETA-LEA Service Agreements

State/LEA	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: Funds from Other Sources	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: In-Kind Contribution	Local education agency mandates participation of CETA youth in basic education skills programs
Illinois			
Bloomington	No	No	No
Chicago	No	No	Undetermined
Evanston	No	No	Undetermined
Ottawa	No	No	No
Springfield	No	No	No
Sycamore	No	No	No
Urbana	No	No	Yes
Indiana			
Evansville	No	Yes	Undetermined
Indiana (contd.)			
Indianapolis	No	No	Undetermined
New Albany	No	No	No
New Castle	No	No	No
Iowa			
Cedar Rapids	No	No	No
Clear Lake	No	No	No
Keokuk	No	No	Yes
Ottumwa	No	No	Undetermined
Kansas			
Wichita	No	No	No
Kentucky			
Bowling Green	Yes	No	No
Louisiana			
Jena	No	No	Undetermined
Oberlin	No	No	Undetermined

Appendix Table 1 (continued)

Summary of Conserva's Findings on Selected Financial and Educational Characteristics of Exemplary CETA-LEA Service Agreements

State/LEA	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: Funds from Other Sources	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: In-Kind Contribution	Local education agency mandates participation of CETA youth in basic education skills programs
Maryland			
Baltimore	No	Yes	No
Denton	No	No	Yes
Hagerstown	No	No	Undetermined
Rockville	No	No	No
Massachusetts			
Boston	No	No	No
Michigan			
Flint	No	No	No
Holland	No	No	No
Traverse City	No	No	Yes
Minnesota			
Minneapolis	No	No	No
Red Wing	NO	Yes	Yes
St. Paul	No	No	Undetermined
St. Paul	No	No	No
Mississippi			
Booneville	No	No	No
Missouri			
Cape Girardeau	No	No	Yes
Columbia	No	No	No
Sikeston	Yes	No	No
Nebraska			
Grand Island	No	No	No
Lincoln	No	No	No
Plattsmouth	No	No	No
Ralston	No	No	Undetermined

Appendix Table 1 (continued)

Summary of Conserva's Findings on Selected Financial and Educational Characteristics of Exemplary CETA-LEA Service Agreements

State/LEA	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: Funds from Other Sources	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: In-Kind Contribution	Local education agency mandates participation of CETA youth in basic education skills programs
Nevada			
Las Vegas	No	No	Yes
New Hampshire			
Manchester	No	No	Undetermined
New Mexico			
Albuqureque	Yes	Yes	No
Santa Fe	No	No	No
New York			
Eden	No	No	Undetermined
New York City	No	Yes	No
Westbury	No	Yes	No
North Carolina			
Charlotte	Yes	No	No
Raleigh	No	No	Yes
North Dakota			
Devil's Lake	No	Yes	No
Ohio			
Bellafontaine	No	No	Yes
Columbus	No	Yes	Undetermined
Springfield	No	No	No
Oregon			
Portland	Yes	No	No
Pennsylvania			
Allegheny City	No	No	No

Appendix Table 1 (continued)

Summary of Conserva's Findings on Selected Financial and Educational Characteristics of Exemplary CETA-LEA Service Agreements

State/LEA	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: Funds from Other Sources	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: In-Kind Contribution	Local education agency mandates participation of CETA youth in basic education skills programs
Pennsylvania (cont.)			
Erie	No	No	Undetermined
Leesport	No	No	Yes
Philadelphia	Yes	Yes	No
Philadelphia	No	No	No
Pittsburgh	No	No	Yes
Rhode Island			
Providence	Yes	No	Undetermined
South Carolina			
Columbia	No	No	Yes
Pendleton	No	No	Undetermined
Spartanburg	No	No	Undetermined
South Dakota			
Pierre	No	No	Undetermined
Texas			
Dallas	No	No	Yes
Palacios	No	No	Undetermined
San Saba	No	No	Yes
Utah			
Salt Lake City	Yes	No	No
Vermont			
Danbey	No	No	No
E. Montpelier	No	No	No
Montpelier	No	No	Undetermined
Virginia			
Norfolk	No	Yes	Yes
Sandston	No	No	No

Appendix Table 1 (continued)

Summary of Conserva's Findings on Selected Financial and Educational Characteristics of Exemplary CETA-LEA Service Agreements

State/LEA	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: Funds from Other Sources	CETA in-school funds matched by local education agency with: In-Kind Contribution	Local education agency mandates participation of CETA youth in basic education skills programs
Washington			
Spokane	No	No	No
Spokane	No	No	Undetermined
Tacoma	No	Yes	No
West Virginia			
Fairmont	No	Yes	Yes
Wisconsin			
Shell Lake	Yes	No	Yes